

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly  
(Formerly *The New Scholasticism*)

Volume 77

Issue No. 1

Winter 2003

---

Table of Contents

*Articles*

- Too Many Friends or None at All? A "Difference" Between  
Aristotle and Postmodernity  
..... JAMES MCEVOY 1
- Aristotle on Monsters and the Generation of Kinds  
..... THOMAS V. UPTON 21
- Weisheipl's Interpretation of Avicbron's Doctrine of the Divine  
Will: Is Avicbron a Voluntarist?  
..... JOHN A. LAUMAKIS 37
- Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome on the Existence  
of God as Self-Evident  
..... MARK D. GOSSIAUX 57
- Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham  
..... MICHAEL J. CHOLBI 81
- The Singular as Event: Postmodernism, Rahner, and Balthasar  
..... STEPHEN FIELDS, S.J. 93

*Discussion*

- Revisiting Aquinas on "Naturalism": A Response to Patrick Lee  
..... JANICE L. SCHULTZ-ALDRICH 113

*Book Reviews*

<i>Driven Back to the Text: The Premodern Sources of Levinas's Postmodernism</i> (Oona Ajzenstat)	MICHELLE BOULOUS WALKER	133
<i>Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia after the Decade of the Brain</i> (Alphonse De Waelhens and Wilfrid Ver Eecke)	THOMAS EWENS	137
<i>Vom Einen zum Vielen: Texte des Neoplatonismus im 12. Jahrhundert</i> (Alexander Fidora and Andreas Niederberger)	MICHAEL HARRINGTON	142
<i>World as Word: Philosophical Theology in Gerard Manley Hopkins</i> (Bernadette Waterman Ward)	MARY BETH INGHAM	146
<b>Books Received</b>		149

at odds with the tradition, although he himself at times projects such a position; rather, he is the philosopher of the twentieth century who is possibly most successful in bringing to light the ways in which this tradition continually exceeds itself. To read Levinas responsibly, then, is to read Levinas as the philosopher who brings these excessive moments back into the tradition. It is to read Levinas as the one who draws from moments within the Hebraic (and Christian) traditions in order to further enrich the infinite rupture that exists—albeit fleetingly—in Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Kant, Dostoyevsky, Bergson, Heidegger, and others (7). To say as much is not to say something entirely new, but to say as much within the context of a detailed engagement with Levinas's Jewish encounters is to contribute much to our appreciation of how we ought to read Levinas.

As for why we should read Levinas, Ajzenstat is convincingly clear. Levinas's philosophy concerns itself

with appeal, it is an appeal to ethical understanding that is at one and the same time an ethical performance. What remains attractive about his critique, she claims, is the alternative that it offers to our contemporary age—an age characterized by oppressive structures that seek to reduce difference to sameness and homogeneity. Levinas's ethical responsibility, enacted in the face-to-face encounter with the other, offers each and every one of us a way of thinking and acting beyond the limitations of self-interest. It is a call to responsibility that awakens what Ajzenstat claims to be the trace of an ancient wisdom. In the end, Levinas's responsibility, she writes, has "everything to do with the fundamental question that Jews and everyone should ask, now more than ever: what am I to do for the different one who stands before me?" (18). And is this not the question of *our* time?

MICHELLE BOULOUS WALKER  
The University of Queensland

PHENOMENOLOGY AND LACAN ON SCHIZOPHRENIA AFTER THE DECADE OF THE BRAIN. By Alphonse De Waelhens and Wilfried Ver Eecke. Louvain: Leuven University Press, 2001. Pp. 337. Paper €30.98. ISBN 9058671607.

Alphonse De Waelhens, phenomenologist, historian of contemporary philosophy to whom we owe the first book-length studies of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and long-time professor of philosophy at the University of Louvain, was convinced that a contemporary philosophical anthropology had to take

account of—indeed, was not possible without the aid of—psychoanalysis, psycho-pathology, and psychiatry. In 1971 De Waelhens published his then ground-breaking study *La psychose. Essai d'interprétation analytique et existentielle*. A translation, along with an introduction critically situating De Waelhens's

contribution, explanatory footnotes, and a bibliography by the translator, Wilfried Ver Eecke, professor of philosophy at Georgetown, was published by Duquesne University Press in 1978 under the title, *Schizophrenia: A Philosophical Reflection on the Structuralist Interpretation of J. Lacan*.

The present volume is something of a hybrid that repackages something old and something new: the something old is Ver Eecke's 1978 translation of and commentary on De Waelhens's earlier work on psychosis (chaps. 2-7 and conclusion), as well as Ver Eecke's original introduction; the something new is two new studies by Ver Eecke, "The usefulness of the theory of De Waelhens/Lacan as an effective approach to schizophrenia, after the decade of the brain," and "Developments in Lacan and Schreber scholarship since the publication of *Schizophrenia* by De Waelhens" (chap. 1, parts one and two).

The title of the present volume might thus be misleading to some, suggesting as it does that De Waelhens and Ver Eecke have addressed the issue of phenomenology and Lacan on schizophrenia after the decade of the brain, that is to say, presumably, the decade of the nineties. De Waelhens, however, died in 1981. Moreover, the new title tends to elide the primary focus of De Waelhens's book, which was not directly on phenomenology (though he is a phenomenologist), or Lacan (though De Waelhens' book is much influenced by Lacan), or even schizophrenia (he also considered other psychoses, especially paranoia), but rather on the larger philosophic issue of the status of rationality in the light of the unconscious and psychic

suffering: what can philosophy learn from psychoanalysis, psychopathology, and psychiatry? The hybrid nature of the volume poses other problems as well (see below).

De Waelhens's *catalogue raisonné* of classic psychiatry's understandings of psychosis; his carefully constructed theory of schizophrenia as a failure of primary repression; his superb analysis of paranoia as a pathology of the mirror-stage; his account of the Oedipal triangle and its absence in psychosis; his penetrating interpretation, after Lacan, of Freud's Schreber Case; his remarkable discussion of what he takes to be the five characteristics of psychosis: a disintegrated body-image, a confusion of signifiers and signifieds, a fundamental perturbation of the Oedipal triangle, an at least virtual bisexuality arising from the failure to situate oneself with respect to sexual difference, the identification of birth and death; his masterly account of the emergence, from Hegel to Husserl and Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty and Maldiney, of the concept of rationality as language and discourse; and, finally, his discussions of the unconscious, language, and reality, of the pre-subject, of the oneiric and the waking, of the existential sense of madness, of the active transcendence of consciousness among many other topics: De Waelhens's presentation of these issues and his interrogation and interpretation of the different dimensions of human rationality revealed in the psychoanalytic clinic are as instructive and provocative today as when he first proposed them.

Though there have been many more recent philosophic studies of psychoanalysis, Freud, and Lacan, especially in

France, De Waelhens's book has remained for many a fundamental reference. Thus, Ver Eecke is right to think that it retains its relevance for philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts alike. Certainly I would not hesitate to recommend it to anyone who wanted to be introduced to the complex issues at the frontiers of philosophy, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis after Lacan. De Waelhens's text has a fine pedagogic quality—several of the chapters grew out of seminars that he gave at Louvain and in the Belgian School of Psychoanalysis—and Ver Eecke's extensive and insightful explanatory notes are very helpful.

There is much to debate in De Waelhens's interpretation of psychosis and the relationships of philosophy and psychoanalysis but this is not the place to engage that debate, for two reasons. On the one hand, De Waelhens's work is already fairly well known, as are many of the issues that his thought raises. (See, for example, the translation of the excellent review article of Antoine Vergote in *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* 15:1 [Spring 1984]: 1–19.) On the other hand, Ver Eecke himself, both in his introduction and in his own discussion of De Waelhens's theses in the light of critics like Vergote and others, contests, develops, and clarifies some of De Waelhens's basic positions. Given the complexity of the issues, it is beyond the scope of a brief review to engage in a critical appraisal of these different contestations, developments, and clarifications. I will, rather, signal one or two of them and give an overview of what one can find in Ver Eecke's important new contributions to this volume.

Before I do so, let me point out a difficulty that faces the reader of this volume, especially one who is not already familiar with De Waelhens's book. Ver Eecke's two essays, which constitute the long, two-part first chapter of this volume, presuppose, rely upon, and constantly refer to De Waelhens's work, that is, the five chapters that follow Ver Eecke's opening chapter. Ver Eecke does a good job of presenting De Waelhens's theses and his own development of them but if the reader has not yet read De Waelhens he remains dependent upon Ver Eecke's presentation of the issues, so that the reader's understanding of them must necessarily remain partial and relatively superficial. From this point of view, it seems that it would have made more sense to put Ver Eecke's essays at the end of the volume. Once again: the packaging, under a new title, of the translation of a previously published book, with two new essays by the translator, who is now billed as the co-author of the new volume, causes difficulties. It would have been more straightforward, if also awkward, to title the book *Psychosis: A Psychoanalytic and Philosophic Interpretation*, with Ver Eecke named as the translator, commentator, and author of two complementary chapters.

One of the strengths of this volume and indeed the probable reason for publishing it in its present format is the cumulative nature of the material presented here. De Waelhens's book dates from 1971. Ver Eecke's 1978 introduction situating De Waelhens's contribution in comparison with Wittgenstein, Sartre, and more recent thinkers adds to our understanding of De Waelhens's text.

Even more helpful are Ver Eecke's explanatory notes and references to more recent philosophic discussions. Nor has Ver Eecke ceased commenting upon this fundamental text, as his two new essays attest. Ver Eecke is one of our most knowledgeable commentators on Freud and Lacan; his own work builds upon and is a vital continuation of his teacher De Waelhens's work, so that one can understand how, over time, Ver Eecke has come to see his work as a kind of joint collaboration with De Waelhens. Thanks to Ver Eecke, we witness an ongoing, regularly updated, thirty-year debate around the fundamental issues of meaning that De Waelhens treats.

Unlike Ricœur, Vergote, and others who take account of what Freud called "economic" (that is, biological) factors in the causality of psychosis, De Waelhens insisted upon the predominantly psychic nature of psychosis. Ver Eecke takes a dual epistemological position. He admits, with neuro-biologists, that there are biological causes of psychosis, but he also wants to demonstrate that there are psychic causes as well. His first essay is a careful, philosophically astute, and somewhat tediously detailed examination of contemporary biological theories of psychosis designed to show that each of these theories leaves room for—indeed, demands—a complementary theory of psychic causation. The tediousness of the detail is the ransom of the seriousness and respect that the author accords to the theories he is examining, and lends credibility and persuasiveness to his account. Ver Eecke shows that contemporary neuro-biological theories also demand a psychological component if

they are to account for their own clinical evidence. After a generation of increasingly biologically and chemically based psychiatry, the argument is an important one for psychiatrists to attend to—if only they would. For readers of this journal, Ver Eecke's skillful use of philosophical theory to re-examine a perennial issue in the context of contemporary debates in psychiatry affords an excellent model of "applied philosophy." Ver Eecke has done a fine job of creating a bridge between the two fields.

Ver Eecke's second essay, "Developments in Lacan and Schreber scholarship since the publication of *Schizophrenia* by De Waelhens," is likely to be of more interest to psychiatrists and, especially, Lacanian psychoanalysts, than to most philosophers. After convincingly correcting what he takes to be an inconsistency in De Waelhens's theory of psychosis, Ver Eecke turns to the issue of therapy with schizophrenics. For this reader, this section, adroitly using as a resource some of the recent Lacanian literature on the Schreber Case (Freud's study of Judge Schreber's case is the urtext of psychoanalytic studies on psychosis) is the most original part of Ver Eecke's contribution. Although this chapter will probably be of more interest to psychotherapists than to philosophers, philosophers may nonetheless learn much from Ver Eecke's discussion of the disjunctions of the imaginary and the symbolic orders and the different ways successful therapies address both the imaginary and the symbolic dimensions of the patient's affliction. This chapter neatly complements the previous one in demonstrating how a coherent

philosophic theory is essential to (albeit almost always lacking in) psychiatric theory and psychotherapeutic practice.

Two concluding observations.

The philosophic task of our time, Merleau-Ponty once said, is to understand *la raison élargie* that confronts philosophy since the work of Marx, Freud, and de Saussure. In the case of Freud, how can we understand the unconscious workings of human rationality without explaining them away? Rationalism, empiricism, dualism, some forms of Thomism (for instance, Dalbiez, the Lonergan of *Insight*, Plé) seem unable to do so. Phenomenology, especially in the hands of a De Waelhens, a Ricœur, or a Maldiney, comes much closer. For De Waelhens, even more than for Ricœur, psychoanalysis can reveal to us the stages of the psychogenesis of human rationality in and across the vicissitudes of the pre-subject. "There where there is a breach or a rent, there may be an articulation normally present," Freud said. Psycho-pathology reveals what is normally hidden from view, he thought, and it is just this clinical material, De Waelhens thinks, that philosophy has to understand. Psychosis is a potentiality at the heart of the structures constitutive of human rationality. It offers a kind of clinical test for the validity of a philosophic theory.

Does De Waelhens—can philosophy—succeed in this task? The question is open. Most psychoanalysts would deny that philosophic comprehension, however valuable, can replace psychoanalytic explanation. Ver Eecke's dual epistemology allows him to agree with the psychoanalysts while at the same time arguing for the necessity of a complementary philosophic

comprehension of the clinical data. Psychosis is not (only) a chemical or neuro-biological event, it is a suffering in and of what is specifically human in us: our rationality and the mysteries of its embodiment in our individual histories.

Second observation. De Waelhens, like Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and many others, understands human beings as essentially beings of language and discourse. De Waelhens speaks of "the primacy of language" and indeed for him schizophrenia is, finally, a failure of the subject to insert itself in the world of language. In part due to Lacan, the reference to language—man is language, we are often told—is omnipresent in contemporary European thought. De Waelhens and Ver Eecke certainly share Lacan's insistence on the central role of language in psychoanalysis. But "language," as Lacan uses the term, is notoriously over-determined. De Waelhens and Ver Eecke are more careful than Lacan, but with them, as with Lacan, language and the lack essential to it (and to human being generally) are variously understood as speech, structure, law, desire, symbolic order, discourse, and so on. The poor donkey is made to carry an impossibly heavy load.

"Language" needs to be deconstructed in the sense that a thinker like Jean Gagnepain gives to that word. When it is, one finds not one rationality, but four analogous modes of rationality (and four analogous modes of lack). Language is speech (*logos*); technologically artificialized into marks of various sorts, it is writing (*topos*); instituted socio-historically as English or Swahili or French, it is communication (*nomos*);

regulated as correct or incorrect, upper or lower class, effusive or evasive, and so on, it is normative (*dike*). Each of these modes of rationality has its own, clinically distinct pathology. Aphasia is a trouble of our capacity for speech. Atechnia is a trouble of our tool-using capacity. Psychosis (and the perversions) are not troubles of speech (psychotics can speak very well), they are rather troubles of our capacity to communicate; finally, neurosis is not a problem of speech, or of tool-using, or of communication, it is a problem of the regulation of human desires. Depending on the pathology in question, one of these modes is primary, the others secondary to it.

Ver Eecke, like De Waelhens, accepts the Hegelian thesis that "in order to unfold the richness of the world

one needs mediation between the self and world" (143) and for them "language" is the first and most fundamental form of that mediation. But a theory like Gagnepain's (which is known as "the theory of mediation") holds that there are at least four ways, not one, in which we mediate our relations between self and world: by our signs, by our tools, by our institutions, by our norms. From this point of view, to explain everything by an appeal to "language" (or, for that matter, to "desire" or "history") is to fail to recognize adequately the different ways we mediate our relations between ourselves and our worlds.

THOMAS EWENS  
Rhode Island School of Design

VOM EINEN ZUM VIELEN: TEXTE DES NEOPLATONISMUS IM 12. JAHRHUNDERT. Ed. and trans. by Alexander Fidora and Andreas Niederberger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002. Pp. xlvii + 174. Paper €24. ISBN: 3465032098.

Twelfth-century Neoplatonism does not always get the attention of students or scholars of the medieval period. Sometimes thought of as the unripe predecessor of a more mature thirteenth century, it languishes in comparative neglect. *Vom Einem zum Vielen* attempts a comprehensive remedy, supplying an introduction to the period as well as a selection of texts and facing-page translations from seven different authors, each accompanied by a detailed commentary, all in only a little over two hundred pages. The editors have been able to compress the work of seven authors

into such a small text by focusing only on their contributions to a single theme: the origin of multiplicity from a transcendent unity.

The sizeable introduction to the volume contains three sections: a history of Platonism from Plato to the Pseudo-Dionysius, a biography of the seven twelfth-century authors whose work appears here, and an account of the relation between philosophy and theology in the twelfth century. The scope of the introduction's first section requires that its treatment of each author be extremely brief. As a result, it is useful only to refresh the memory